D3.1.9-12: Gathering Evidence from a Wide Range of Views

Overview

Lesson Procedure

75-80 minutes of class time across 5 phases.

1. Warm-Up10 minutes
2. Direct Instruction25-30 minutes
3. Guided Practice15 minutes
4. Independent Practice15 minutes
5. Closure10 minutes

1. Warm-Up10 minutes

   Warm-Up Prompt

   "After a close game, the losing coach, the winning coach, a sportswriter and a fan all explain why one team lost. Whose explanation would you trust on which points, and why would you want all four?"

   Collect answers. Students usually notice that each speaker knows different things and has different reasons to tell the story a certain way. Introduce the indicator: when gathering information, historians deliberately look for a wide range of views, then use five lenses (origin, authority, structure, context and corroborative value) to decide how far to rely on each.

2. Direct Instruction25-30 minutes

   Part 1: The question. On June 25-26, 1876, warriors of the Lakota, Northern Cheyenne and Arapaho defeated the 7th Cavalry at the Little Bighorn River in Montana, and Custer's five companies were killed (NPS Battle Story page; Source 6, paragraph 4). The compelling question is "Why was Custer's command defeated at the Little Bighorn?" The battle is a vehicle for the skill: students will gather relevant information from sources made by Army officers, a critic, a Sioux participant, a Sioux historian and a modern federal agency.

   The five lenses, in brief: origin (who made the source, when, and how the maker knew), authority (what qualifies the maker to judge this point), structure (what kind of document it is and how its form shapes what it says, including reprints and selections), context (the circumstances and purposes behind it) and corroborative value (how far independent sources confirm it). A wide range of views means sources whose makers stood in different positions, not just more sources from the same side.

   Source Information: who made each source, when, and from what position (from the sources themselves and the NPS page)

   Source	Maker and position	When made	How the maker knew
   1: Reno's report	Major Marcus A. Reno, who commanded three companies, "140 men" (Source 6, paragraph 2), and then the regiment after Custer's death (Source 1, paragraph 1)	Dated July 5, 1876; printed by Victor in 1881 with "a few unimportant paragraphs" omitted	Fought in the valley and on the bluffs; followed Custer's trail afterward
   2: Rosser's charge and Reno's reply	General T. L. Rosser, called one of "Gen. Custer's personal friends"; Reno answering him	Letters of 1876, published in the Army and Navy Journal, printed by Victor in 1881	Rosser's basis is not stated in the passage; Reno fought in the battle
   3: Sheridan's report	Lieutenant General Philip H. Sheridan, commander of the Military Division of the Missouri (NPS Battle Story page)	His report for 1876, printed by Victor in 1881	"From all the information that has reached me" (Source 3, paragraph 2)
   4: Rain-in-the-Face	A "noted Sioux warrior" (Eastman's words, Source 4, paragraph 1) who fought in the battle, interviewed by Eastman	Told about two months before his death on September 14, 1905; printed in 1918	Fought in the battle; some details, he says, are what is "generally said"
   5: Eastman	Charles A. Eastman (Ohiyesa), who writes of "the Sioux nation, to which I belong" and wants to present chiefs "in the light of the native character and ideals" (Indian Heroes, chapter 1)	1918	Not at the battle; writes as a historian of his people
   6: National Park Service	The federal agency that manages the battlefield	Page last updated April 23, 2025	Draws on "Modern historians" and "Archeologial finds" (paragraphs 1 and 3)
   Printer of 1-3: Victor	Frances Fuller Victor, author of a history of the Sioux War, who reprints and introduces the documents	1881	Collected and selected published documents

   Part 2: Read the sources. Students read Sources 1-6 and keep an evidence log: each piece of relevant information, its source and paragraph, the maker's position, and one lens note. Terms: devolved (passed down), qui vive (on the alert), divide (high ground between two river valleys), lodges and tepees (the households of the camp), coulee (a deep ravine), Long-Haired Chief (Rain-in-the-Face's name for Custer).

   1After the battle in which Lieut. Col. Custer lost his life, the command of the 7th Cavalry regiment devolved on Major Reno. The following is a copy of Reno's official report to Gen. Terry, excepting that a few unimportant paragraphs are omitted. It is dated July 5th, 1876.

   [...]

   2"After following over his trail, it is evident to me that Custer intended to support me by moving further down the stream, and attacking the village in flank; that he found the distance to the ford greater than he anticipated; that he did charge, but his march had taken so long, although his trail shows he moved rapidly, that they were ready for him; that Companies C and I, and perhaps part of Company E, crossed to the village or attempted it at the charge and were met by a staggering fire; and that they fell back to secure a position from which to defend themselves; but they were followed too closely by the Indians to permit him to form any kind of a line. I think had the regiment gone in as a body, and from the woods in which I fought advanced on the village, its destruction was certain; but he was fully confident they were running, or he would not have turned from me. I think (after the great number of Indians that were in the village) that the following reasons obtained for the misfortune: His rapid marching for two days and one night before the fight, attacking in the day time at 12 p.m. and when they were on the qui vive, instead of early in the morning; and lastly, his unfortunate division of the regiment into three commands.

   1Major Reno's conduct on the first day of the fighting on the Little Big Horn, has been severely criticised by several of Gen. Custer's personal friends; and one of them, Gen T. L. Rosser, in a letter addressed to Reno and published in the Army and Navy Journal, blames him for taking to the timber when his "loss was little or nothing." "You had," he says, "an open field for cavalry operations, and I believe that if you had remained in the saddle and charged boldly into the village, the shock upon the Indians would have been so great that they would have been compelled to withdraw their attacking force from Custer, who, when relieved, could have pushed his command through to open ground, where he could have manoeuvred his command, and thus greatly have increased his chances of success." It would seem as if this and similar criticisms were sufficiently answered by Reno's report; and by his reply to Rosser, which is given in part below:—

   [...]

   2"As I neared the village the Indians came out in great numbers, and I was soon convinced I had at least ten to one against me, and was forced on the defensive. This I accomplished by taking possession of a point of woods where I found shelter for my horses. I fought there dismounted, and made my way to within 200 yards of the village, and firmly believe that if, at that moment, the seven companies had been together the Indians could have been driven from their village. As we approached near their village they came out in overwhelming numbers, and soon the small command would have been surrounded on all sides, to prevent which I mounted and charged through them to a position I could hold with the few men I had.

   3"You see by this I was the advance and the first to be engaged and draw fire, and was consequently the command to be supported, and not the one from which support could be expected. [...]

   1Lieut. Gen. Sheridan, in his report for 1876, expresses his views of the Custer disaster as follows:—

   2"As much has been said in regard to the misfortune that occurred to General Custer and the portion of his regiment under his immediate command in this action, I wish to express the conviction I have arrived at concerning it. From all the information that has reached me, I am led to believe that the Indians were not aware of the proximity of Custer until he had arrived within about eight or nine miles of their village, and that then their scouts who carried the intelligence back to the valley were so closely followed up by Custer, that he arrived on the summit of the divide overlooking the upper portion of the village, almost as soon as the scouts reached it. As soon as the news was given, the Indians began to strike their lodges and get their women and children out of the way—a movement they always make under such circumstances. Custer, seeing this, believed the village would escape him if he awaited the arrival of the four companies of his regiment—still some miles in his rear. Only about 75 or 100 lodges or tepees could be seen from the summit or divide, and this, probably, deceived him as to the extent of the village. He therefore directed Major Reno, with three companies, to cross the river and charge the village, while he, with the remaining five companies, would gallop down the east bank of the river behind the bluff and cut off the retreat of the Indians. Reno crossed and attacked gallantly with his three companies—about 110 men—but the warriors, leaving the women to strike the lodges, fell on Reno's handful of men and drove them back to and over the river with severe loss.

   [...]

   3"Had the 7th Cavalry been kept together, it is my belief it would have been able to handle the Indians on the Little Big Horn, and under any circumstances it could have at least defended itself; but separated as it was into three distinct detachments, the Indians had largely the advantage in addition to their overwhelming numbers. If Custer had not come upon the village so suddenly, the warriors would have gone to meet him, in order to give time to the women and children to get out of the way, as they did with Crook only a few days before, and there would have been, as with Crook, what might be designated a rearguard fight—a fight to get their valuables out of the way, or in other words, to cover the escape of their women, children and lodges."

   1The noted Sioux warrior, Rain-in-the-Face, whose name once carried terror to every part of the frontier, died at his home on the Standing Rock reserve in North Dakota on September 14, 1905. About two months before his death I went to see him for the last time, where he lay upon the bed of sickness from which he never rose again, and drew from him his life-history.

   [...]

   2“When we crossed from Tongue River to the Little Big Horn, on account of the scarcity of game, we did not anticipate any more trouble. Our runners had discovered that Crook had retraced his trail to Goose Creek, and we did not suppose that the white men would care to follow us farther into the rough country.

   3“Suddenly the Long-Haired Chief appeared with his men! It was a surprise.”

   [...]

   4“When the troops were surrounded on two sides, with the river on the third, the order came to charge! There were many very young men, some of whom had only a war staff or a stone war club in hand, who plunged into the column, knocking the men over and stampeding their horses.

   5“The soldiers had mounted and started back, but when the onset came they dismounted again and separated into several divisions, facing different ways. They fired as fast as they could load their guns, while we used chiefly arrows and war clubs. There seemed to be two distinct movements among the Indians. One body moved continually in a circle, while the other rode directly into and through the troops.

   6“Presently some of the soldiers remounted and fled along the ridge toward Reno’s position; but they were followed by our warriors, like hundreds of blackbirds after a hawk. A larger body remained together at the upper end of a little ravine, and fought bravely until they were cut to pieces. I had always thought that white men were cowards, but I had a great respect for them after this day.

   7“It is generally said that a young man with nothing but a war staff in his hand broke through the column and knocked down the leader very early in the fight. We supposed him to be the leader, because he stood up in full view, swinging his big knife [sword] over his head, and talking loud. Some one unknown afterwards shot the chief, and he was probably killed also; for if not, he would have told of the deed, and called others to witness it. So it is that no one knows who killed the Long-Haired Chief [General Custer].

   1[...] It is well known to us that it is Crook rather than Reno who is to be blamed for cowardice in connection with Custer’s fate. The latter had no chance to do anything, he was lucky to save himself; but if Crook had kept on his way, as ordered, to meet Terry, with his one thousand regulars and two hundred Crow and Shoshone scouts, he would inevitably have intercepted Custer in his advance and saved the day for him, and war with the Sioux would have ended right there. Instead of this, he fell back upon Fort Meade, eating his horses on the way, in a country swarming with game, for fear of Crazy Horse and his braves!

   [...]

   2That leader had quickly saddled his favorite war pony and was starting with his young men for the south end of the camp, when a fresh alarm came from the opposite direction, and looking up, he saw Custer’s force upon the top of the bluff directly across the river. As quick as a flash, he took in the situation--the enemy had planned to attack the camp at both ends at once; and knowing that Custer could not ford the river at that point, he instantly led his men northward to the ford to cut him off. The Cheyennes followed closely. Custer must have seen that wonderful dash up the sage-bush plain, and one wonders whether he realized its meaning. In a very few minutes, this wild general of the plains had outwitted one of the most brilliant leaders of the Civil War and ended at once his military career and his life.

   3In this dashing charge, Crazy Horse snatched his most famous victory out of what seemed frightful peril, for the Sioux could not know how many were behind Custer. He was caught in his own trap. To the soldiers it must have seemed as if the Indians rose up from the earth to overwhelm them. They closed in from three sides and fought until not a white man was left alive. Then they went down to Reno’s stand and found him so well intrenched in a deep gully that it was impossible to dislodge him. Gall and his men held him there until the approach of General Terry compelled the Sioux to break camp and scatter in different directions.

   1Modern historians estimate the village numbered around 8,000, with a warrior force of 1,500-1,800 men. Custer's initial plan had been to conceal his regiment in the Wolf Mountains through June 25, which would allow his Crow and Arikara scouts time to locate the Indian village. Custer then planned to make a night march, and launch an attack at dawn on June 26; however, the scouts reported the regiment's presence had been detected by Lakota or Cheyenne warriors. Custer, judging the element of surprise to have been lost, feared the inhabitants would attack or scatter into the rugged landscape, causing the failure of the Army's campaign. Custer ordered an immediate advance to engage the village and its warrior force.

   2At the Wolf Mountain location, Custer ordered a division of the regiment into four segments: the pack train with ammunition and supplies (125 men), three companies (125 men) commanded by Captain Frederick Benteen, three companies (140 men) commanded by Major Marcus Reno and five companies (210 men) commanded by Custer. Benteen was ordered to march southwest with the objective of locating any Indians, "pitch into anything" he found, and send word to Custer. Custer and Reno's advance placed them in proximity to the village, but still out of view. When it was reported that the village was scattering, Custer ordered Reno to lead his 140-man battalion, plus the Arikara scouts, and to "pitch into what was ahead" with the assurance that he would "be supported by the whole outfit".

   [...]

   3It is known that after ordering Reno to charge the village, Custer rode northward along the bluffs until he reached a broad drainage known as Medicine Tail Coulee, a natural route leading down to the river and the village. Archeologial finds indicate some skirmishing occurred at Medicine Tail ford. For reasons not fully understood, the troops fell back and assembled on Calhoun Hill. The warriors, after forcing Major Reno to retreat, now began to converge on Custer's maneuvering command as it forged north along what today is called Custer or Battle Ridge.

   [...]

   4About 40 men of the original 210 were cornered on the hill where the stone monument now stands. Hundreds of Lakota and Cheyenne warriors surrounded them. Toward the end of the fight, soldiers, some on foot, others on horseback, broke out in a desperate attempt to get away. All were pulled down and killed in a matter of minutes. The warriors quickly rushed to the top of the hill, dispatching the last of the wounded. Superior numbers and overwhelming firepower brought the Custer portion of the Battle of the Little Bighorn to a close.

   Part 3: Model the selection. Work through the five examples. Each one applies a lens to a specific passage and ends with a selection decision: what to gather from the source, and how far to rely on it.

   • Origin: whose selection are we reading? (Source 1, paragraph 1)

     Can Source 1 be quoted as "Reno's report" without qualification?

     Result: Only with a note. Victor prints "a copy of Reno's official report to Gen. Terry, excepting that a few unimportant paragraphs are omitted" (Source 1, paragraph 1). The words are Reno's, but which paragraphs were "unimportant" was Victor's choice, not Reno's. Selection decision: use Source 1 for Reno's stated reasons, cite it as Reno's report as printed by Victor, and look for the full report in Army records before relying on what may be missing.

   • Authority: a commander who was not there (Source 3, paragraph 2)

     How much weight should Sheridan's account of Custer's approach carry?

     Result: Sheridan had the authority of the Army's regional commander, but he was not at the battle: his views come "From all the information that has reached me" (Source 3, paragraph 2), and he marks his own inferences, writing that the small number of visible lodges "probably, deceived him" (Custer). Selection decision: use Sheridan as the Army's official explanation, and check each detail against participants such as Reno and Rain-in-the-Face.

   • Context: when, and by whom, a report was written (Source 1, paragraphs 1-2)

     What should a reader keep in mind about the reasons Reno gives for the defeat?

     Result: Reno wrote on July 5, 1876, about ten days after the battle, as the officer to whom "the command of the 7th Cavalry regiment devolved" (Source 1, paragraph 1), and as an officer whose own actions would be judged. His three reasons, Custer's "rapid marching," the daytime attack and "his unfortunate division of the regiment into three commands" (paragraph 2), all point to decisions made by Custer. Selection decision: keep the report as a participant's explanation, but weigh it as the account of an interested party.

   • Corroborative value: agreement that may not be independent (Sources 1, 3 and 6)

     The claim: Custer divided the regiment before the attack. How well is it corroborated, and how well is the claim that the division caused the defeat?

     Result: The division itself is well corroborated: Reno names "three commands" (Source 1, paragraph 2), Sheridan says the regiment was "separated as it was into three distinct detachments" (Source 3, paragraph 3), and the NPS lists "four segments," counting the pack train (Source 6, paragraph 2). The interpretation that the division caused the defeat comes from Reno and Sheridan, and Sheridan built his view from "the information that has reached me," which likely included Reno's report. Selection decision: treat the division as an established fact and its effect as one argument, to be weighed against the other views on the page.

   • A wide range of views: who was surprised? (Sources 3, 4 and 6)

     Was the village taken by surprise?

     Result: The sources answer from different positions. Sheridan writes that "the Indians were not aware of the proximity of Custer" until he was within eight or nine miles (Source 3, paragraph 2). Rain-in-the-Face says, "Suddenly the Long-Haired Chief appeared with his men! It was a surprise" (Source 4, paragraph 3). The NPS reports that Custer's scouts told him "the regiment's presence had been detected," so Custer, "judging the element of surprise to have been lost," attacked at once (Source 6, paragraph 1). Selection decision: gather all three. Together they suggest that Custer believed he had been seen while many in the camp were still caught unprepared, a claim no single source makes.

3. Guided Practice15 minutes

   Groups place every source on Diagram 1 and then answer: Which views are well represented, and which are thin? For example, there is one Sioux participant and no Northern Cheyenne or Arapaho voice on this page, while three sources come through Victor's 1881 book. Each group then names one more source it would look for to widen the range, and says which lens makes it valuable.

   Teacher model: "Three of our sources pass through one 1881 book, chosen and trimmed by one editor. That is a structure and context problem, not just a numbers problem. I would look for the full Army reports and for accounts by Cheyenne participants."

4. Independent Practice15 minutes

   Each student writes a one-paragraph answer to the compelling question, built from relevant information gathered from at least four sources that represent at least three different positions. After the paragraph, the student adds a short selection note: for each source used, one sentence naming the lens that justified using it and how far they relied on it.

   Success criteria: the evidence is relevant to why the command was defeated; the sources span different positions; each source's weight is justified with a lens; the paragraph separates well-corroborated facts from contested interpretations.

5. Closure10 minutes

   Exit ticket: "Which source on this page changed your answer the most, and which lens explains why it deserved that weight?"

   Teacher note on the sources: Sources 1-3 are quoted exactly from the Wikisource transcription of Victor's 1881 book, Sources 4-5 from the Project Gutenberg text of Eastman's 1918 book, and Source 6 from the NPS page. Several passages in Sources 2 and 3 use slurs or derogatory terms for the Lakota and Cheyenne; those passages are omitted and the omissions are marked. Victor's chapter heading and some sources use "Little Big Horn," an older spelling of Little Bighorn. The figures in the sources, such as Reno's "ten to one" and the NPS estimate of "1,500-1,800" warriors, are the makers' claims or estimates. Analyze the battle through the documents; do not assign students roles as soldiers or warriors. Source 7 is invented for this page.

   Quiz passage. Questions 11-13 of the quiz use Source 7, three invented evidence selections. Some are deliberately weak, for students to evaluate.

   1Three students in an invented twelfth-grade class each chose three sources to answer "Why was Custer's command defeated at the Little Bighorn?" Some selections are stronger than others.

   2Amir chose Sources 1, 2 and 3. He wrote: "These are the official Army records, so they are the most reliable. Three sources that mostly agree give strong corroboration."

   3Beatriz chose Sources 3, 4 and 6. She wrote: "I wanted the Army commander, a Sioux warrior who fought in the battle, and the modern Park Service. They were made in 1876, 1905 and 2025 by people with very different positions, so where they agree, the agreement means something."

   4Cole chose Sources 2, 5 and 6. He wrote: "I picked the sources that blame someone, because the question is about blame. Rosser blames Reno, Eastman blames Crook, and the Park Service blames Custer."

Differentiation Strategies

Assessment Guidance

1. Question 1 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   Rain-in-the-Face says, "It is generally said that a young man with nothing but a war staff in his hand broke through the column and knocked down the leader" (Source 4, paragraph 7). What does "generally said" tell you about the origin of this detail?

   AHe watched it happen from close by BEastman added the detail himself CHe is repeating what others said DIt comes from Reno's official report

2. Question 2 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   Rain-in-the-Face told his story to Eastman in the summer of 1905. About how many years after the battle was that?

   AAbout 9 years BAbout 19 years CAbout 29 years DAbout 42 years

3. Question 3 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   Eastman writes, "It is well known to us that it is Crook rather than Reno who is to be blamed" (Source 5, paragraph 1). What is the most accurate judgment of this sentence as evidence?

   AIt settles the question, since Eastman was a Sioux writer BIt repeats Sheridan's official verdict on Crook CIt is worthless, since Eastman was not at the battle DIt shows a Sioux view, but the passage gives no proof

4. Question 4 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   The NPS writes, "For reasons not fully understood, the troops fell back and assembled on Calhoun Hill" (Source 6, paragraph 3). What does this phrase tell a reader about the source?

   AThe agency is unsure of the facts on every point BThe page marks where the evidence runs out CThe agency is hiding what it really knows DThe page is not written by historians at all

5. Question 5 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   Sheridan says Reno attacked with "about 110 men" (Source 3, paragraph 2); the NPS says Reno led a "140-man battalion" (Source 6, paragraph 2). What is the best way to handle the difference?

   AAverage them and report about 125 men BReport both and seek the unit's own records CDrop the number, since the sources disagree DUse Sheridan's, since he was the commander

6. Question 6 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   In Source 2, paragraph 1, Victor writes that Rosser's criticism and others like it "were sufficiently answered by Reno's report." Why does this matter for anyone gathering evidence from Sources 1-3?

   AIt shows Victor took a side in the debate BIt proves that Rosser's letter was invented CIt shows that Reno wrote Victor's book DIt means Victor printed Reno in full

7. Question 7 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   Which set of three sources represents the widest range of positions?

   ASources 1, 2 and 3 BSources 1, 4 and 6 CSources 2, 3 and 5 DSources 1, 2 and 6

8. Question 8 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   Which piece of information is least relevant to the question "Why was Custer's command defeated?"

   A"I had a great respect for them" B"fell on Reno's handful of men" C"his unfortunate division of the regiment" D"Superior numbers and overwhelming firepower"

9. Question 9 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   Rain-in-the-Face describes "two distinct movements among the Indians. One body moved continually in a circle, while the other rode directly into and through the troops" (Source 4, paragraph 5). Why is this especially valuable to gather?

   AIt comes from a participant on the side that won BIt gives the exact number of warriors in each body CIt was written down on the day of the battle DIt agrees word for word with Sheridan's report

10. Question 10 of 20 · Multiple Choice

    Eastman says he wanted to present the chiefs "in the light of the native character and ideals" (Source Information table). How should this purpose shape the way you use Source 5?

    AIgnore it, because a writer with a purpose is biased BUse it only for its dates, never for its judgments CTreat it as neutral, since it was written in 1918 DRead it as a Sioux interpretation; check details

11. Question 11 of 20 · Multiple Choice

    Read Source 7. What is the main flaw in Amir's selection?

    AHe uses too few sources to answer the question BHe chose sources from too many positions CHis three sources share one side and one book DHe relied only on sources from after 1900

12. Question 12 of 20 · Multiple Choice

    What is the main strength of Beatriz's selection in Source 7?

    AHer makers' positions and dates differ widely BShe chose only the sources that agree completely CShe used every source that is on the page DShe chose the three oldest sources available

13. Question 13 of 20 · Multiple Choice

    Cole writes that "the Park Service blames Custer." Which reading of Source 6 is more accurate?

    AThe NPS blames Reno for leaving the timber BThe NPS blames Crook for falling back CThe NPS refuses to describe the battle DCuster's choice and the warriors' strength

14. Question 14 of 20 · Multiple Choice

    A later popular book names one warrior as the man who killed Custer but cites no participant. How should Source 4 affect a researcher's use of that book?

    AIt proves the book's claim is correct BIt casts doubt on the claim without new evidence CIt has no bearing, since it is a later account DIt shows that Custer was not killed in the battle

15. Question 15 of 20 · Short Answer

    Gather three pieces of information relevant to the compelling question, each from a source made by someone in a different position. Quote each, and name the position.

    Show model answer

16. Question 16 of 20 · Short Answer

    Rosser blames Reno; Eastman blames Crook. Using at least two lenses for each, explain how much support each charge has from the sources on this page.

    Show model answer

17. Question 17 of 20 · Short Answer

    Amir (Source 7) claims his three sources give "strong corroboration." Explain why that claim is weak, and revise his selection.

    Show model answer

18. Question 18 of 20 · Short Answer

    Explain why Cole's selection rule, "I picked the sources that blame someone," weakens his evidence gathering, even though each of his sources is relevant.

    Show model answer

19. Question 19 of 20 · Short Answer

    Some readers treat the Army's official reports as the most reliable sources on this battle. Using the indicator's lenses, explain why the Sioux sources should also be gathered.

    Show model answer

20. Question 20 of 20 · Short Answer

    Choose four sources on this page that represent at least three different positions for a final answer to the compelling question. For each, write one sentence naming the lens that justifies it and one sentence on how far you will rely on it.

    Show model answer

These standards connect to D3.1.9-12: prerequisites to review first, parallel standards at the same level, and next steps that build on it.

Standard text: National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS), The College, Career, and Civic Life (C3) Framework for Social Studies State Standards: Guidance for Enhancing the Rigor of K-12 Civics, Economics, Geography, and History (Silver Spring, MD: NCSS, 2013). NCSS was not involved in the production of this lesson and does not endorse it.