D2.His.1.9-12: Unique Circumstances and Broader Contexts in History

Overview

Lesson Procedure

70-85 minutes of class time across 5 phases.

1. Warm-Up10 minutes
2. Direct Instruction20-25 minutes
3. Guided Practice15-20 minutes
4. Independent Practice15-20 minutes
5. Closure10 minutes

1. Warm-Up10 minutes

   Warm-Up Prompt

   "Think of a time your school changed a rule. Was the change caused by something about your school in that particular year, or by something happening in many schools at once? How could you tell the difference?"

   Take three answers and push on the last question. Introduce two tests that historians use. The necessity test asks: if this factor had been absent, would the event still have happened in much the same way? The specificity test asks: does this factor explain why the event happened here and now, or would it explain many similar events in many places? A factor that passes both tests carries a lot of weight. Then pose the lesson's question: Was the Berlin crisis of 1948-1949 a product of Berlin's unique situation, or of the Cold War that surrounded it?

2. Direct Instruction20-25 minutes

   Part 1: Two lenses. Write two column heads on the board. Unique circumstances of time and place are conditions particular to one setting: its geography, its people, its laws and agreements, the technology and memories of that moment. Broader historical contexts are developments that reach well beyond the setting: an international rivalry, an economic system, a movement of ideas. Most events need both: the broad context supplies the stakes, and the circumstances decide where, when and in what form the conflict breaks out.

   Part 2: Read Source 1. Gloss occupation zones (areas of defeated Germany governed by each victorious power), Bizonia (the joined American and British zones), Allied Control Council (the four powers' body for running Germany together) and Deutschmark (the new Western currency). Students mark circumstances in one color and contexts in another.

   1At the end of the Second World War, U.S., British, and Soviet military forces divided and occupied Germany. Also divided into occupation zones, Berlin was located far inside Soviet-controlled eastern Germany. The United States, United Kingdom, and France controlled western portions of the city, while Soviet troops controlled the eastern sector. As the wartime alliance between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union ended and friendly relations turned hostile, the question of whether the western occupation zones in Berlin would remain under Western Allied control or whether the city would be absorbed into Soviet-controlled eastern Germany led to the first Berlin crisis of the Cold War. The crisis started on June 24, 1948, when Soviet forces blockaded rail, road, and water access to Allied-controlled areas of Berlin. The United States and United Kingdom responded by airlifting food and fuel to Berlin from Allied airbases in western Germany. The crisis ended on May 12, 1949, when Soviet forces lifted the blockade on land access to western Berlin.

   [...]

   2[...] Two and a half million Berliners, spread between four zones of occupation, faced profound privations: Allied bombing had reduced the city to rubble, shelter and warmth were scarce, the black market dominated the city’s economic life, and starvation loomed. [...]

   3The year 1947 saw major shifts in occupation policy in Germany. On January 1, the United States and United Kingdom unified their respective zones and formed Bizonia, which caused tensions between East and West to escalate. In March, the breakdown of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers and the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine served to harden the lines of an increasingly bipolar international order. In June, Secretary of State George Marshall announced the European Recovery Program. The purpose of the Marshall Plan—as the program came to be called—was not only to support economic recovery in Western Europe, but also to create a bulwark against Communism by drawing participating states into the United States’ economic orbit.

   4In early 1948, the United States, United Kingdom, and France secretly began to plan the creation of a new German state made up of the Western Allies’ occupation zones. In March, when the Soviets discovered these designs, they withdrew from the Allied Control Council, which had met regularly since the end of the war in order to coordinate occupation policy between zones. In June, without informing the Soviets, U.S. and British policymakers introduced the new Deutschmark to Bizonia and West Berlin. The purpose of the currency reform was to wrest economic control of the city from the Soviets, enable the introduction of Marshall Plan aid, and curb the city’s black market. Soviet authorities responded with similar moves in their zone. Besides issuing their own currency, the Ostmark, the Soviets blocked all major road, rail, and canal links to West Berlin, thus starving it of electricity, as well as a steady supply of essential food and coal

   Part 3: Read Source 2. Gloss "onus" (burden of responsibility) and "Operation Vittles" (the American name for the airlift). Then model the four worked examples, naming the test used each time.

   1The United States and United Kingdom had few immediate options if hostilities broke out. Because of the draw down in U.S. and British combat forces since the end of the Second World War, the Red Army stationed in and around Berlin dwarfed the Western Allied military presence. On June 13, 1948, the administrator of U.S.-occupied Germany General Lucius Clay reported to Washington that “There is no practicability in maintaining our position in Berlin and it must not be evaluated on that basis.... We are convinced that our remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent.” The Truman administration agreed. Based upon written agreements with the Soviet Union in 1945, the only connections to Berlin left to the Western Allies were air corridors from West Germany used to supply Berlin by air. The administration calculated that if the Soviets opposed the airlift with force, it would be an act of aggression against an unarmed humanitarian mission and the violation of an explicit agreement. Thus, the onus of igniting a conflict between the former allies would be on the aggressor.

   2The United States launched “Operation Vittles” on June 26, with the United Kingdom following suit two days later with “Operation Plainfare.” Despite the desire for a peaceful resolution to the standoff, the United States also sent to the United Kingdom B-29 bombers, which were capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The beginning of the airlift proved difficult and Western diplomats asked the Soviets to seek a diplomatic solution to the impasse. The Soviets offered to drop the blockade if the Western Allies withdrew the Deutschmark from West Berlin.

   3Even though the Allies rebuffed the Soviet offer, West Berlin’s position remained precarious, and the standoff had political consequences on the ground. In September 1948, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), the German Communist Party of the Soviet zone of occupation, marched on the Berlin City Council and forced it to adjourn. Fearing that the Western Allies might halt the airlift and cede West Berlin to the Soviets, 300,000 West Berliners gathered at the Reichstag to show their opposition to Soviet domination. The turnout convinced the West to keep the airlift and the Deutschmark.

   4In time, the airlift became ever more efficient and the number of aircraft increased. At the height of the campaign, one plane landed every 45 seconds at Tempelhof Airport. By spring 1949, the Berlin Airlift proved successful. The Western Allies showed that they could sustain the operation indefinitely. At the same time, the Allied counter-blockade on eastern Germany was causing severe shortages, which, Moscow feared, might lead to political upheaval.

   5On May 11, 1949, Moscow lifted the blockade of West Berlin. The Berlin Crisis of 1948–1949 solidified the division of Europe. Shortly before the end of the blockade, the Western Allies created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Two weeks after the end of the blockade, the state of West Germany was established, soon followed by the creation of East Germany. The incident solidified the demarcation between East and West in Europe; it was one of the few places on earth that U.S. and Soviet armed forces stood face-to-face. It also transformed Berlin, once equated with Prussian militarism and Nazism, into a symbol of democracy and freedom in the fight against Communism.

   • Unique circumstance of place (Sources 1 and 3)

     Why could the Soviets cut off West Berlin at all?

     Result: Source 1 says Berlin "was located far inside Soviet-controlled eastern Germany" (paragraph 1), and Murphy wrote two days into the blockade that "The unfavorable logistical situation has been obvious from the start" (Source 3, paragraph 1). Specificity test: passed, since the condition describes Berlin in particular, a city deep inside the other side's zone. Necessity test: passed, since without that location a blockade by closing land routes would not have been possible. Evaluation: location explains the form of the Soviet pressure.

   • Unique circumstance of time (Source 1)

     Why did the blockade begin in June 1948 rather than earlier?

     Result: Source 1 reports that "In June, without informing the Soviets, U.S. and British policymakers introduced the new Deutschmark to Bizonia and West Berlin," and that "Soviet authorities responded with similar moves in their zone" (paragraph 4). Evaluation: the currency reform explains the timing. It passes the specificity test for that month, but alone it does not explain why either side thought the city worth a crisis.

   • Broader historical context (Source 1)

     Why did both sides treat a currency dispute as a test of strength?

     Result: Source 1 says the breakdown of the Moscow Conference and the Truman Doctrine "served to harden the lines of an increasingly bipolar international order" (paragraph 3). A bipolar order is one dominated by two rival powers. Evaluation: this context fails the specificity test, since it touched all of Europe, but it explains the stakes: in a two-sided contest, a retreat anywhere looked like a loss everywhere.

   • Circumstance shaping the response (Source 2)

     Why did the Western answer take the form of an airlift?

     Result: Source 2 explains that "Based upon written agreements with the Soviet Union in 1945, the only connections to Berlin left to the Western Allies were air corridors from West Germany used to supply Berlin by air" (paragraph 1). Evaluation: agreements written in 1945, about three years earlier and in a different moment of the alliance, decided which route the West could use without breaking an agreement. This is a unique circumstance of time, not a feature of the Cold War in general.

3. Guided Practice15-20 minutes

   Pairs read Source 3, a secret telegram written by Robert Murphy, the U.S. political adviser in Berlin, at midnight on June 26, 1948, and Source 4, the American note of July 6. For each source they find one circumstance of time or place and one broader context that the writer uses to argue his case, and they apply both tests to each. Gloss "CFM" (the Council of Foreign Ministers), "docilely" (without resistance), "tantamount" (equivalent) and "comity" (courtesy between nations).

   1[...] My assumption is that when western powers accepted Berlin arrangement they did so with knowledge of the possibility of Soviet pressure. The unfavorable logistical situation has been obvious from the start. It results from a defective agreement negotiated by Mr. Winant and others in 1944 in an outburst of faith and good will designed to induce the USSR to work in Germany with the US/UK in some form of organization however faulty. The Berlin question was discussed last December at London by your delegation to CFM. It was my understanding that your policy was determined then to stay in Berlin with the risk such policy entailed. Otherwise that would have been a favorable moment to stage a voluntary withdrawal because of Soviet failure to cooperate.

   2In the interval, presence in Berlin of Western occupants became a symbol of resistance to eastern expansionism. It is unquestionably an index of our prestige in central and eastern Europe. As far as Germany is concerned, it is a test of US ability in Europe. If we docilely withdraw now, Germans and other Europeans would conclude that our retreat from western Germany is just a question of time. US position in Europe would be gravely weakened, and like a cat on a sloping tin roof.

   [...]

   3[...] Our retreat from Berlin would be tantamount to an acknowledgment of lack of courage to resist Soviet pressure short of war and would amount to a public confession of weakness under pressure. It would be the Munich of 1948. [...]

   4As unfavorable as our logistical situation in Berlin may be, the Soviets will be faced with the dilemma either of permitting supplies to come through from the west or of feeding the Berlin population. Mass starvation of this population would not seem to harmonize with present Soviet political aims in Germany. I believe that Soviet tactic is to frighten the German population into believing that they may starve, thus inciting them against the western occupants. Unrest, strikes and rioting might result but we could ride out the storm as long as we are physically in possession of the western sectors of Berlin. I believe the USSR will bargain in the end.

   5These are the conditions which face us. If we are determined, both in our minds and in our dealings with the UK and France, Soviet pressure tactics, no matter how skillful should not force us out of Berlin.

   1[...] The United States Government regards these measures of blockade as a clear violation of existing agreements concerning the administration of Berlin by the four occupying powers.

   2The rights of the United States as a joint occupying power in Berlin derive from the total defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany. [...]

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   3It clearly results from these undertakings that Berlin is not a part of the Soviet zone, but is an international zone of occupation. Commitments entered into in good faith by the zone commanders, and subsequently confirmed by the Allied Control Authority, as well as practices sanctioned by usage, guarantee the United States together with other powers, free access to Berlin for the purpose of fulfilling its responsibilities as an occupying power. The facts are plain. Their meaning is clear. Any other interpretation would offend all the rules of comity and reason.

   4In order that there should be no misunderstanding whatsoever on this point, the United States Government categorically asserts that it is in occupation of its sector in Berlin with free access thereto as a matter of established right deriving from the defeat and surrender of Germany and confirmed by formal agreements among the principal Allies. It further declares that it will not be induced by threats, pressures or other actions to abandon these rights. It is hoped that the Soviet Government entertains no doubts whatsoever on this point.

   5This Government now shares with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom the responsibility initially undertaken at Soviet request on July 7, 1945, for the physical well-being of 2,400,000 persons in the western sectors of Berlin. Restrictions recently imposed by the Soviet authorities in Berlin have operated to prevent this Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom and of France from fulfilling that responsibility in an adequate manner.

   [...]

   Teacher prompts: Murphy wrote before the airlift was under way and before he knew how the crisis would end; what does that let his telegram show that Source 2 cannot? Source 4 was written to be handed to the Soviet government; how might that audience shape what it stresses? Note for students that Murphy's phrase "the Munich of 1948" compares a retreat from Berlin to an earlier agreement he expected his reader to recognize. Ask what the phrase shows about the way he judged the moment, without adding outside facts about the earlier event.

4. Independent Practice15-20 minutes

   Students read Source 5, the U.S. ambassador's report of Stalin's explanation, and Source 6, two sample interpretations written for this page. They underline every reason Stalin gives and label it circumstance or context, then decide which sample interpretation the Soviet case supports better. Then they answer the quiz, which uses Sources 1-6.

   1[...] Following précis of conversation is from notes made by English and French interpreters and is accurate summary:

   [...]

   2Stalin, after pointing out that the meeting was an unusual one with the representatives of three powers present, set forth his views on the following lines. The restrictive transport measures undertaken by the Soviet authorities had been caused (1) by technical reasons, (2) because large quantities of equipment were moving westwards from Berlin, and (3) because the London decisions, and more especially the currency reform and introduction of western zone currency into Berlin at the center of the Soviet occupation zone, had disrupted the economy of that zone. The Soviet authorities were defending the Soviet zone.

   3As long as we have treated Germany as a whole, the presence of allied occupation troops in Berlin, as the capital, is natural; but geographically Berlin was center of Soviet zone. As a result of the London Conference, a separate state had been created in western Germany with its capital at Frankfurt. Two capitals now existed, and as a result of these recent changes the right of the western powers to maintain troops in Berlin had lost its juridical basis. It was in this sense that the relevant passage of the Soviet note of July 14 should be understood. If there were two states in Germany, Berlin could not be regarded as the capital of the whole of Germany. Stalin then stated most emphatically that this did not, however, mean that the restrictive measures employed by the Soviet authorities were intended to oust the allied troops from Berlin. Even if the allies failed to reach agreement on the future of Germany, and even if Berlin were supplied exclusively by the Soviet Government, there was still no intention on the Soviet part of ousting allied forces from Berlin. He had, however, wanted to bring out the juridical position as the Soviet Government saw it. He repeated that all the restrictive measures adopted by the Soviet authorities had been to prevent the invasion of the Soviet zone by the special western currency, and resulted from the tactics of the three powers at the London Conference.

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   4[...] Stalin explained that the only real issue he had in mind was the formation in the western zones of a German Government. He did not mind unification of the three zones, and even considered it progress. The Soviet zone also formed a unity but they had not thought of creating a government there, although we seemed to be pushing him towards it. That was the issue. He understood that the Parliament of the western zones would meet on September 1 to set up a government, and then there would be nothing to discuss. On a question from the American Ambassador, he confirmed that his only objection was the physical establishment of a government in western Germany, because there was still a chance of creating a single government for Germany as a whole when we eventually met, which would automatically solve the Berlin question. [...]

   1Interpretation A. The blockade and the airlift were products of one city's unusual position at one moment. Berlin was "located far inside Soviet-controlled eastern Germany" (Source 1), so its western sectors could be cut off by closing road, rail and canal links. Murphy traced the weakness to "a defective agreement" made in 1944 (Source 3). The airlift was possible because written agreements of 1945 had left the Western Allies air corridors, and it was needed because Western forces, reduced since the war, were far smaller than the Red Army around the city (Source 2). Change any one of these circumstances and the crisis would have taken a different shape.

   2Interpretation B. Berlin was the stage, not the cause. The contest over Germany and Europe had been building since 1947: Bizonia, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (Source 1), and then the secret Western plan for a new German state (Sources 1 and 5). Both sides treated Berlin as a symbol, as Clay and Murphy wrote (Sources 2 and 3). The crisis ended the way the broader conflict was already heading, with NATO, two German states and a divided Europe (Source 2). A crisis of this kind would have broken out somewhere along the line between East and West; Berlin was simply where the line was weakest.

5. Closure10 minutes

   Exit ticket: Name the single circumstance of time or place that you think mattered most to the shape of the Berlin crisis, and the single broader context that mattered most. In two sentences, explain which of the two you would remove if you could keep only one, and why.

   Teacher note on the sources: Sources 3, 4 and 5 come from Foreign Relations of the United States, the State Department's official documentary record, and they are quoted exactly, including the telegram style of Sources 3 and 5, which drops small words. Source 5 gives Stalin's case only as the American ambassador summarized it from interpreters' notes; no Soviet document is printed here. Source 1 dates the end of the crisis to May 12, 1949, while Source 2 says "On May 11, 1949, Moscow lifted the blockade"; the page leaves the difference as the source prints it, and Question 10 asks students how to handle it. (For the teacher: the Soviet order lifting the blockade took effect at one minute after midnight, Berlin time, on May 12, 1949, so accounts give both dates.) In the same way, Source 1 counts "Two and a half million Berliners, spread between four zones of occupation," while Source 4 gives "2,400,000 persons in the western sectors of Berlin"; read literally, both rounded figures cannot describe the same people at the same time, and Homework Problem 2 asks students to question them rather than pick one. Sources 1 and 2 are a U.S. government history written long after the events: phrases such as "Soviet domination" and "a symbol of democracy and freedom in the fight against Communism" are its characterizations, so ask students how a Soviet or East German account of 1948 might have described the same events. The lesson takes no side in present-day politics; it asks students to weigh how each government explained its actions in 1948.

Differentiation Strategies

Assessment Guidance

1. Question 1 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   Source 1, paragraph 2 lists the "profound privations" Berliners faced after the war. Which of these does it NOT list?

   AShelter and warmth were scarce BThe black market dominated economic life CAn epidemic had closed the city's schools DAllied bombing had left the city in rubble

2. Question 2 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   According to Source 1, paragraph 4, which was NOT a stated purpose of the June 1948 currency reform?

   ATo pay for the Western armies in Berlin BTo wrest economic control of the city from the Soviets CTo enable the introduction of Marshall Plan aid DTo curb the city's black market

3. Question 3 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   In the quotation in Source 2, paragraph 1, how does General Clay justify staying in Berlin?

   ABerlin could be held easily by Western forces BThe city's factories were vital to Western Europe CThe Soviet army was too weak to stop an airlift DStaying was essential to American prestige

4. Question 4 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   According to Source 2, paragraph 1, what did the Truman administration calculate would follow if the Soviets used force against the airlift?

   AThe United Nations would order the airlift to stop BThe Soviets would bear the blame for starting a conflict CBritain and France would pull their own forces out of Berlin DCongress would have to declare war on the Soviet Union

5. Question 5 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   Besides the airlift, what military step does Source 2, paragraph 2 say the United States took?

   AIt sent nuclear-capable B-29 bombers to Britain BIt sent armed truck convoys along the roads into Berlin CIt moved its main army from western Germany into the city DIt placed its warships in the Baltic Sea off Soviet ports

6. Question 6 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   What did the Soviets offer, according to Source 2, paragraph 2?

   ATo share control of Tempelhof Airport with the Western Allies BTo let food trains through if the Western airlift was halted CTo drop the blockade if the Deutschmark left West Berlin DTo withdraw from East Berlin if the West withdrew from West Berlin

7. Question 7 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   According to Source 2, paragraph 3, what convinced the West to keep the airlift and the Deutschmark?

   AA vote of the four powers on the Allied Control Council BThe turnout of 300,000 West Berliners at the Reichstag CA Soviet promise to stop pressuring the Berlin City Council DGeneral Clay's report that the airlift was now efficient enough

8. Question 8 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   Source 2 says that at the height of the airlift "one plane landed every 45 seconds at Tempelhof Airport." At that rate, how many planes landed in one hour?

   A45 B60 C800 D80

9. Question 9 of 20 · Multiple Choice

   Source 1 says the crisis "started on June 24, 1948" and "ended on May 12, 1949." How many days is that, counting from June 24 to May 12?

   A322 days B323 days C352 days D292 days

10. Question 10 of 20 · Multiple Choice

    Source 1, paragraph 1 says the crisis ended on May 12, 1949, but Source 2, paragraph 5 says "On May 11, 1949, Moscow lifted the blockade." What should a historian do?

    AUse Source 2's date, since it appears later on the same page BChoose May 12, since that date appears in the first paragraph CNote the difference and check other records of the lifting DDiscard the whole page as unreliable because it disagrees with itself

11. Question 11 of 20 · Multiple Choice

    According to Murphy in Source 3, paragraph 1, why was the 1944 agreement on Berlin made the way it was?

    AThe Americans expected to leave Germany within a year BThe British refused to accept a zone that touched Berlin CThe Soviets had threatened to stop fighting the war DIt grew out of wartime hopes of working with the USSR

12. Question 12 of 20 · Multiple Choice

    Murphy wrote, "I believe the USSR will bargain in the end" (Source 3, paragraph 4). Which detail in Source 2 best supports the view that the blockade became costly for Moscow?

    APlanes landed at Tempelhof every 45 seconds BThe counter-blockade caused severe shortages in the East CA crowd of 300,000 West Berliners gathered at the Reichstag DAmerican B-29 bombers were sent to bases in the United Kingdom

13. Question 13 of 20 · Multiple Choice

    How do Source 4 and Source 5 differ about Berlin's place in Germany?

    ASource 4 calls Berlin an international zone; Stalin calls it the center of the Soviet zone BSource 4 calls Berlin part of the Soviet zone; Stalin calls it an international zone CBoth sources agree that Berlin is the capital of all Germany, and differ only on access DSource 4 names Berlin the capital of the western state; Stalin names it the Soviet capital

14. Question 14 of 20 · Multiple Choice

    Which reason for the transport restrictions does Stalin NOT give in Source 5, paragraph 2?

    ATechnical reasons BEquipment moving westwards from Berlin CThe currency reform and the London decisions DThe arrival of American bombers in Britain

15. Question 15 of 20 · Multiple Choice

    According to Source 5, paragraph 4, what did Stalin call "the only real issue he had in mind"?

    AThe Western airlift flying into Berlin BReparations still owed by Germany CA new government in the western zones DUniting the three western zones

16. Question 16 of 20 · Multiple Choice

    Stalin said the restrictions were not "intended to oust the allied troops from Berlin" (Source 5, paragraph 3). Which evidence from another source gives a historian the most reason to question that claim?

    AThe American note's pledge not to abandon its rights in Berlin BMurphy's view that the Soviets meant to turn Berliners against the West CClay's statement that the city had become a symbol of American intent DThe report that B-29 bombers were sent to bases in the United Kingdom

17. Question 17 of 20 · Short Answer

    Murphy warns that a retreat "would amount to a public confession of weakness under pressure. It would be the Munich of 1948" (Source 3, paragraph 3). What does this comparison show about how a circumstance of time shaped the way American officials judged the crisis?

    Show model answer

18. Question 18 of 20 · Short Answer

    The American note (Source 4, paragraphs 2-3) and Stalin (Source 5, paragraph 3) each base their legal case on a particular moment. Identify the moment each one chooses and evaluate why each side chose it.

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19. Question 19 of 20 · Short Answer

    Which interpretation in Source 6, A or B, better explains why the blockade ended when it did, in May 1949? Support your judgment with evidence from Sources 2-5.

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20. Question 20 of 20 · Short Answer

    Source 2, paragraph 5 says the crisis "solidified the division of Europe." Evaluate whether that result depended on Berlin's unique circumstances or would probably have come from the broader context anyway.

    Show model answer

These standards connect to D2.His.1.9-12: prerequisites to review first, parallel standards at the same level, and next steps that build on it.

Standard text: National Council for the Social Studies (NCSS), The College, Career, and Civic Life (C3) Framework for Social Studies State Standards: Guidance for Enhancing the Rigor of K-12 Civics, Economics, Geography, and History (Silver Spring, MD: NCSS, 2013). NCSS was not involved in the production of this lesson and does not endorse it.